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External and internal crossroads for
banking supervision in Southern Africa*
JOSEPH J NORTON**
1 Introduction
During the autumn of 1994, two events of significance occurred that could have
a major bearing on the future direction of banking supervision in the Republic
of South Africa and Southern Africa. The first event is of an external, regional
dimension: the newly, and informally constituted "East and Southern Africa
Banking Supervisors' Group" ("ESABS") held its first meeting. The second
event is of an internal, domestic dimension: on 27 October 1994 "The Housing
Accord-Housing the Nation" was set forth at Botshabelo, Orange Free State
(the "Botshabelo Accord"). The purpose of this article is to consider the
challenges and opportunities presented by each of these occurrences for the
banking regulators and banking industry in Southern Africa and to draw
together certain interconnections between these two dimensions of banking
supervision.
2 The external dimension
The supervision of international banks, when viewed primarily from the focus
of "capital adequacy" and the Basle Committee's 1988 Capital Report and of
"consolidated supervision" as reflected in the Basle Concordat (as revised and
supplemented), has proven to be of a "through the looking glass" nature.
Terms such as "capital adequacy" and "consolidated supervision" have come
to serve more as "code words" for enhanced and broadened bank supervision
on both the international and domestic level. Further, a discrete focus upon
selective national jurisdictions (that is, the United States and United Kingdom), the regional jurisdiction of the European Community (EC) and the
limited international forum of the Basle Committee1 has unfolded into a
* This article is based upon a series of presentations made in Johannesburg during the period of
31 October-8 November 1994 under the sponsorship of the Research Institute for Banking
Law, Rand Afrikaans University. In particular, the author expresses his sincerest appreciation
to Professor Francois Malan, Director of the Institute and Professor of Banking Law at RAU
and to Mr Alex Pienaar, Senior Legal Officer with the Standard Bank, Johannesburg.
** Sir John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University
of London); Professor of Banking Law (SMU School of Law, Dallas, Texas); Editor-in-Chief,
The International Lawyer.
The formal, initial name of the Committee is the "Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices." The name has been changed to the Basle Committee on Banking

Supervision.
The institutions represented on the Basle Supervisors Committee are:
Belgium: National Bank of Belgium
Banking Commission
Canada: Bank of Canada
Office of the Inspector General of Banks
France: Bank of France
Banking Commission
Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank
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complex web of interconnected supervisory standards and practices having
2
legal significance globally.
Recent developments in the Republic of South Africa bear out these
observations. The 1990 Deposit-taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990, as
amended, 3 incorporates significant aspects of the Basle supervisory standards. 4
Also, as alluded to above, in 1993 the South African banking authorities joined
an informal group of regional bank supervisors that (in turn) is "tied into" the
Basle process and that held its first meeting this past Autumn 1994. 5
This part 2 provides informed observations as to what "trends" in international bank supervision have become apparent from a "looking back" at the
terrain covered over the past decade and as to the possible implications for the
Republic of South Africa and Southern Africa.

Federal Banking Supervisory Office
Italy: Bank of Italy
Japan: Bank of Japan
Ministry of Finance
Luxembourg: Luxembourg Monetary Institute
Netherlands: The Netherlands Bank
Sweden: Sveriges Riksbank
Royal Swedish Banking Inspectorate
Switzerland: Swiss National Bank
Swiss Federal Banking Commission
United Kingdom: Bank of England
United States: Federal Reserve Board
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Secretariat Bank for International Settlements
Reference to the founding mandate for the Committee from the Governors of the central
banks of the G-10 countries is a Press Communiqu6 of the G-10 central bank Governors of Feb.
12, 1975 issued through the BIS. Since 1982, the Secretariat of the Committee has endeavoured
to prepare an annual "Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision," which
summarizes the annual work of the Committee.
For further discussion of the Committee, see, inter alia, Norton "The work of the Basle
Supervision Committee on Bank Regulation... " 1989 Int'l Law 245.
2 See generally Norton Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards (1995), portions of
which have provided the research base for this § 2.
See Malan and Faul "Introduction to the Deposit-taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990" 1991 TSAR
379.
4 See Pienaar "The prudential requirements of the Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 94 of 1990"
1992 TSAR 475.
5 An East and Southern Africa Banking Supervisors' Group ("ESABS") was formed in 1993; and
a West and Central African Group of Bank Supervisors ("WCABS") was inaugurated in 1994.
The ESABS group is represented by thirteen countries: Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwewith its steering committee made up of Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
The WCABS group is initially composed of eight countries: Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory
Coast, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zaire. See discussion of these and various other
Basle "affiliated subgroups of bank supervisors in Basle Committee, Report on International
Developments in Banking Supervision, Reports No 8 (Chapter II) and 9 (Chapter X) (1992 and
1994).
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2.1 Perceived trends in international bank supervision
2.1.1 An enhanced framework for international bank supervision
The closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI")
involved only the failure of a $20 billion asset-sized financial institution (about
the size of a moderate-size United States regional bank); and, as such it does
not appear that this failure (even if left unattended by the international
regulators) would have created any serious systemic problems for the international banking community. Nevertheless, it is clear that for London, New York
and other world financial markets to continue to prosper there must be a level
playing field that instills integrity and confidence on a global basis. BCCI was
a case of widespread institutional fraud on a global scale (involving at least 19
jurisdictions) and brought into question the ability of the domestic regulation
of international banks to control such transborder fraud.
The remainder of this decade will offer continuing evidence that we are in a
global financial market transcending national and regional boundaries. Increasingly supervisors will be required to act jointly if they are to create and to
preserve integrity in what has become a world-wide banking system. 6 But what
should be remembered is that the recent notoriety of BCCI is really only a
tangential event in the development of this "international network of cooperating supervisors". The Basle Committee's cooperative efforts date back to
1974 and have evolved significantly since then-internal and external to the
committee; the close cooperation between United States and United Kingdom
supervisors have been longstanding (notwithstanding Basle); and the notion of
supervisory cooperation is ingrained in both the EC and United States legal
framework for banking.
Perhaps the efforts of the Bank of England, its ad hoc "college" of
international supervisors, 7 and the Federal Reserve Board in the BCCI affair
were too little, too late: certainly the "college" was not an effective substitute
for a "lead regulator". But the broader observation is that, at the relevant
times, the only feasible approach was through a working international network
of cooperating supervisors. Over this decade, something better than this adhoc
crisis-orientated approach most probably will emerge with respect to international financial services generally and with respect to the need for better
international information flows-with Basle Committee, EC and United States
efforts in these areas serving as catalytic forces for international reform.
2.1.2 Effective Consolidated Supervision
The international bank supervisors, over this past decade, have developed
principles of "consolidated supervision" under the original and revised (1983)
Basle Concordats (as supplemented in 1990 and in 1993).8 The utilization by
6 See, eg, BCCI testimony of Messrs Mattingly, Taylor and Corrigan of United States and NY
Federal Reserve before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, United States
House of Representatives (13 September 1991).
7 Prior to the closure, this informal "college" comprised banks regulators from the UK, Switzerland, Spain, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, France and the United Arab
Emirates and was established as an information gathering and sharing vehicle.
8 A copy of "1983 Revised Concordat" was published in 1983 Int'l Leg Mt 900. The Basle
Committee has since supplemented the Revised Concordat in April 1990: see Supplement to the
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BCCI of affiliated bank holding company structures in jurisdictions selfavowedly incapable of any effective consolidated supervision (Luxembourg
and the Cayman Islands) and the operation of a hidden "bank within a bank"
made evident the existence of persisting and glaring gaps in this supervisory
concept. But BCCI aside, the new EC Consolidated Supervision Directive and
Prudential Supervision Directive 9 and recent pronouncements by the Basle
Committee go a long way toward closing these remaining gaps (though, most
likely, all gaps cannot be sealed). But the realities of consolidated supervision
operate on the national level; it requires effective coordination and convergence of regulatory and supervisory standards and flows of quality information
between home and host country regulators to ensure that there is always an
informed and an effective "lead regulator." The recent United States statute
(Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act-FBSEA) and regulations on
foreign bank supervision incorporate (that is, internalize) the principles of
"effective" consolidated supervision into the application, termination and
examination administrative's processes for foreign banks in the United
States. 10
2.1.3 Qualified Home Country Supervision
As the baby should not be thrown out with the bath water, so the principle of
home country supervision as espoused by the Basle Committee and the EC
Second Directive should not be abandoned. 1 What BCCI made clear is that
home country supervision only makes sense where that jurisdiction has at least
comparable supervisory standards to that of the host jurisdiction, has a capacity
to implement and enforce such standards, and has a deposit insurance and/or
lender of last resort dimension. The EC authorities have recently rethought and
redefined the "mutual recognition" and "home country control" vehicle for
convergence of national supervisory standards. 12 The United States authorities
have already given the Federal Reserve the powers, under the FBSEA, to step
13
into the breach where home country supervision is unfeasible or inadequate.
2.1.4 Greater transparency and disclosure
Secrecy and confidentiality traditionally have been ingrained into the temperament of bankers and central bankers. However, this can lead to an opaque and
non-transparent system, as witnessed by the BCCI affair. A radical review of
the possible benefits of greater transparency (not only on a supervisory level,
but on public and marketplace levels) is what is needed, in a somewhat similar
way as it was needed with securities firms and markets. Clearly, there needs to
be a better informed and more transparent international banking system
respecting both quantitative and qualitative data and respecting an appropriate
international vehicle for digesting, evaluating and disseminating such informaConcordat: The Ensuring of Adequate Information Flows Between Banking Supervisory
Authorities, published and attached to Information Flows Between Banking Supervisory
Authorities (BIS, April 1990).
9 See Dassesse et al EC Banking Law (1994).

Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991 (FBSEA), Pub L No 102-242, 105 Stat 2236 (1991)
Tit II.
I See EC Council Directive (Second Banking Directive), 89/646/ 1989 OJL 38611.
12 See proposed EC Prudential Supervision Directive, (1993) OJ C229/10.
10 See

13 see

n 6.
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tion. Market disclosure may be the best form of market and institutional
discipline. 14 However, broad disclosure can in some jurisdictions (such as the
impede international supervisory coopUnited States) greatly complicate and
15
information.
of
exchange
in
eration
2.1.5 Increased Role of Auditors and Converging Accounting Standards
Related to the issue of transparency is the proper role of auditors in the
supervisory processes. In BCCI, one finds different auditors auditing different
affiliated entities under differing national standards. In a consolidated and
transparent supervisory network this situation cannot be permitted. But
though it may be possible to require one reputable independent auditor (or at
least a co-ordination of audits) for an affiliated group, it will be a long-term
project to try to harmonize or converge the disparate accounting and auditing
principles and standards existing world-wide (though the Basle Committee and
IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee have begun this diasupervisory and
logue). Also, the relationship of auditors to the official 16
regulatory examination processes will need to be sorted out.
2.1.6 Inevitability of Greater Legalism
Because of the complexities of the issues, the multiplicity of the parties
involved, the needs for transparency and fairness of application and the
inherent "culture" of various jurisdictions (for instance, the United States and
certain EC countries), greater legalism will creep into international and EC
bank regulation. Such legalism has been anathema to the Bank of England,
which prefers the more informal method of "moral suasion" and participative
discussions with relevant parties. However, it was (in part) this inability to
come to terms with the legalism of the 1987 Banking Act and an apprehension
of judicial review that stymied the bank from acting sooner and more decisively
in respect of BCCI. Certainly, the density of regulation that exists in the United
States is not a desired international norm, but some reasonable level of legalism
in bank regulation and supervision is needed to ensure transparency, uniformity of application and fairness within the international banking system. 17
2.1.7 International Insolvency Laws
Multilateral work will need to be encouraged respecting acceptable international solutions to transnational insolvencies of banking institutions such as
BCCI. Such attempts generally have proven to be protracted and most
difficult, as can be seen in the efforts to harmonize EC bankruptcy laws. These
attempts become even more problematic when dealing with financial institutions. But for an international supervisory network to work at an optimum
level, such problems will need to be addressed on a regional and broader
See, eg, remarks by Murray on "International bank supervision" for Euromoney Conference on
InternationalBanking Regulation After BCCI: What's Wrong and How it Can be Put Right
(London, 20-21 November 1991).
" See Taylor and Corrigan of United States and NY Federal Reserve, Testimony to United States
House of Representatives Committee, (n 6).
16See remarks by Fowle on "Role of auditors" Euromoney Conference on InternationalBanking
Regulation (n 14).
17 Remarks by Norton on "International bank supervision" at Euromoney Conference (n 14).
14
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basis, 18

multilateral
along with issues of the existence of a deposit insurance
scheme or lender-of-last resort to reach banking institution operating internationally. 19 These concerns may well become exacerbated as banking institutions in Mexico, Russia and other emerging, developing and transitioning
economies (including in Africa) find themselves "under water."
2.1.8 Co-ordinated and Effective Enforcement
An international supervision network cannot ensure effective national supervision, on a ground level, or prompt and effective national enforcement action
(both civil and criminal). These aspects will remain in the hands of national
authorities; and, as such, the chain of international supervision will always
ultimately be subject to the problem of weak or unco-ordinated national links
in the enforcement chain. However, more co-ordinated efforts and better
cooperation of the Basle Committee, the EC authorities and the dominant
national authorities (for instance, of the US, the UK, Germany and Japan) can
promote better national enforcement practices.2 0 International cooperative
activities in the money laundering area are only a starting point. 2 1
2.1.9 Linking Banking and Securities Supervisory Standards
The linkage of banking and securities supervision will become more apparent
and co-ordinated. First, many of the European banking models (for instance
Germany), as well as the EC Second Banking Directive, embrace the "universal" banking concept that permits securities activities as legitimate banking
activities. 22 Even in the United States, where there has long been a federal
statutory dichotomy between commercial and investment banking (enshrined
in the Glass-Steagall Act), considerable regulatory and judicial erosion of this
division has occurred in recent years, and considerable pressure is being placed
on the congress by the United States Treasury and others to repeal the
Glass-Steagall Act. 23 Second, as prudential concerns continue to focus on a
"risk evaluation" of bank activities, it becomes clear that "market risks"
(particularly respecting securities),
and not simply credit risks, will need to be
addressed by the regulators. 24
However, substantial disparities exist as to how securities firms treat market
risks and capital adequacy. 25 To avoid conflict between the securities and bank
18See

Goode "The insolvency implications for banks" in Cranston (ed) European Banking Law:
The Single Market (1994) ch 7; and Fletcher "International insolvency: a case for study and
treatment" in Norton et al (eds) International Banking Operations and Practices: Current
Developments (1994).
19 See, eg, EC Proposed Directive on Deposit Guarantee Scheme, (1993) OJ C178.
20 See remarks by Sturmer on "Practical problems of enforcement and compliance" Euromoney
Conference (n 14).
21 See, inter alia, Gilmore, InternationalEfforts to Combat Money Laundering (1992).
21 See Gardener and Molyneux Changes in Western EuropeanBanking:An InternationalBanker's
Guide (1991).
23 See Norton & Whitley Banking Law Manual (1994) ch 16.
24 See Hayward "Prospects for international co-operation by bank supervisors" in Norton (ed)
Banking Regulation and Supervision in the 1990s (1991).

25 See United States General Accounting Office, "Securities Markets: Challenges to Harmonizing
International Capital Standards Remain" (Report GAO/GGD-92-41-1992); and Haberman,
"Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment Banks: Contracts on Regulation" Fed
Res Bd of NYQ Rev at 1 (Autumn 1987).
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regulators will require each to minimize competitive advantages between
securities firms linked to investment banks and those linked to other banking
and prudent approach
institutions by a co-ordinated development of a workable
26
issues.
capital
related
and
risks
market
to such
In recent years, the Basle Committee and the ad hoc International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have begun to address these issues
27
regarding traded debt and equity securities and related "capital" definitions.
Also the issue of derivatives is a matter of mutual concern. In addition, an
informal "Tripartite" Committee, through which international bank, securities
and insurance supervisors liaise, has been initiated.
2.1.10 Bank supervision as an "art": the inadequacy of capital adequacy
The bank supervisors' "love affair" with capital adequacy will undoubtedly
continue in the short-term. But what is unfolding is an incongruity and density
of approaches as the regulators try to objectively non-credit risks within an
all-embracing capital adequacy formula. Already, it has become clear that any
such formula will probably not achieve the policy objective of competitive
equality; 28 that any forced convergence in such areas as market risk (particularly when trying to converge standards of banks with those of investment
firms) will most probably lead to divergency; that the burdens and expenses
imposed by such a "high-tech" capital adequacy formula may well exceed the
benefits; and that the growing density of such a formula is becoming counter29
productive to the residual policy objective of increased transparency. As has
international supervisor: "Bank supervision is
been rightly noted by a leading
30
not a science, but an art."
The relevance and importance of capital adequacy should be kept within the
bounds of this perspective. Obviously, it is an important factor of supervision,
but an over-tinkering with capital regulation may simply lead to over complexity and an increase of marketplace innovations designed to take advantage of
inevitable distortions in the capital regulations. As suggested by the chairman
of the United States Federal Reserve Board, Greenspan, the bank regulators
need to gain a better perspective on the range of risks inherent in such products
31
and a better understanding of the relationship among different risk types.
2.1.11 An International Institutional Structure?
The recent Key andScott Report of the Group of Thirty has pondered possible
international supervisory structures; some commentators even suggest (in an
26Cf Dale "Banking and securities business: the separation issues,' and trachtman, 'perestroika in
bank regulation: advantages of securities regulation for a market economy" in Norton (ed) Bank
Regulation and Supervision in the 1990s (1991).
27 See Joint Statement by Breeden, Chairman, Technical Committee of IOSCO, and Corrigan,

Chairman of Basle Committee (released 29 January 1992).

28 See Scott and Iwahara In Search of a Level Playing Field: The Implementation of the Basle

CapitalAccord in Japan and the United States (Group of Thirty, 1994).
29See, eg, 'Greenspan says as banking changes, regulators need to change with the times" 1994
BNA Bank Rep 859.
30 See "Remarks by E Gerald Corrigan, President Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the 7th
International Conference of Banking Supervisors" Cannes, France (8 Oct 1992).
31See "Greenspan says... " (n 29).
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ideal world) a multilateral treaty approach. However, what appears realistic
and feasible is a continuing maturation and enhancement of the currently
informal Basle Committee structure so that this vehicle can assume a broader
role in the overall convergence process of international supervisory standards;
in the assembly, coordination, analysis and dissemination of relevant supervisory information; in the uniform interpretation of the standards and practices;
and in the ultimate surveillance of compliance with and effective implementation by national jurisdiction.
The Basle Committee also most probably will accelerate its attempts to
influence and to assist the practices of non-OECD (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development) bank supervisors and its dialogue with international securities supervisors. 33 On an EC level, it is probable that when
Economic and Monetary Union approaches, so also will proposals for an
umbrella EC bank supervisory authority appended to the new EC central
bank. 34 On a national level, effective linkages will need to be created between
national authorities, regional authorities and the Basle Committee. 35
Diagram One following this article's text graphically depicts how extensive
the "web of influence" of the Basle Committee has been woven.
2.1.12 The Basle Committee's 1989 capital report (and its related pronouncements) as "international administrative soft law"
The enquiry as to whether the Basle Committee's 1988 Capital Report (and its
other related pronouncements) constitute "international soft law" adds a
certain air of profoundness to the enquiry by appearing to require some form
of serious response to the classical jurisprudential questions regarding whether
soft law is "law". Such an approach, however, would appear to miss the mark.
Certainly the use of the term "soft law" of itself is an admission that one is
not dealing with "firm law" in any traditional sense. Such an admission,
however, in no way diminishes the importance of determining whether a
particular instrument or report is "soft law." If it is soft law, then there is at least
a quasi-legitimacy to it as drawn from the collective intent among those
involved with the preparation of that instrument or report that the standards
36
and principles espoused therein be observed.
On balance, one could reasonably conclude that the Basle 1988 Capital
Report and related Basle Committee pronouncements constitute a type of
"soft international law for the following reasons": 37
(1) Over the past two decades the Basle Committee has been recognized
3 See Key and Scott InternationalTrade in Banking Services: A ConceptualFramework(Group of
Thirty, 1991). Dale, in his testimony before the UK's Treasury and Civil Service Committee of
the House of Commons surmised: "The Basle arrangements seek to be global but are
substantially voluntary and in an ideal world no doubt we would have a legally binding
international agreement which would also be global in scope .
3 See Hayward (n 24).
34See, eg, Reportprepared by Fourcans on behalf of the EU Parliament's Committee on Monetary
Affairs, presented on 5 May 1994.
3 See United States General Office of Accounting, International Banking: Strengthening the
Framework for Supervisory International Banks (GAO/GGO-94-68).
36 See discussion by Gold "Developments in the international monetary system, the international
monetary fund and international monetary law since 1971" 1982 Recueil des Cours 107 156 et
seqq.
37 See generally Norton Devising InternationalBank Supervisory Standards (1995) chs 5 and 6.
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worldwide as the authoritative source for setting supervisory standards
with respect to international banking matters.
(2) Though the Committee has no legal source for its existence, its members
comprise significant regulatory authorities with significant domestic
law-generating capacities.
(3) The areas acted and pronounced upon to date by the Basle Committee
have been areas of common concern of its member supervisors.
(4) Though most of the pronouncements have been cast in general terms,
these terms (particularly since 1988) are more than aspirational in that it
is clearly the intent of the Member States to implement the Basle
principles/standards.
(5) By so intending to act and by so acting, Committee members in effect
create a form of equitable estoppel with respect to any recalcitrant
member.
(6) The authoritative stature of the Basle Committee has been further
recognized, and not questioned, with respect to its interpretative and
amendment powers in relation to the 1988 Basle Capital Report and the
Basle Concordats.
(7) The numerous interconnections of the Basle Committee with regional
and national law-making authorities, with regional groupings of supervisors and with international financial and monetary institutions generate
numerous degrees of forward transmission of the Basle standards into
actual domestic and/or regional law and practice.
An additional note of importance, it is significant to note that the Basle
Committee since 1983 has phrased much of its language in an increasingly more
mandatory manner. Whereas the 1983 Basle Concordat was intended to be
"principles of best practice", the latest refinement of the Concordat is in the
form of the "1992 minimum standards". It is not simply inadvertent that the
term "principles" has been transformed into that of "minimum standards",
and the fact that the "G-10 supervisory authorities do observe these standards". Further, as noted above, the role of the committee as a "monitor of its
members' experiences in implementation" has become an integral part of the
role of the committee.
Moreover, one cannot help but conjecture as to the legal significance of the
Basle Committee and its various pronouncements before a local judiciary that
may be considering questions related to these pronouncements (for example,
judicial review over some domestic regulatory pronouncements regarding
capital adequacy). At minimum, the Basle Committee and its various statements and practices would appear to be a legitimate "persuasive source" of
legal interpretation for a particular judiciary on a relevant point of domestic law
rooted in or derived from Basle standards.
But at the end of the day, the legitimacy of the Basle Committee's
pronouncements rests on a negotiated consensus process and on the large
reservoir of goodwill among its member supervisors. So long as such process
and reservoir continue, then the Basle Committee can be viewed as an
internationally authoritative and law-generating source for international banking standards.
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2.2 The implications
The Basle Committee has operated on a low-key (and, at most times, on a
non-transparent) basis since its came into being in 1974. It has focused its
efforts on areas of prudential supervision respecting international banks which
are of common interest among its constituent members. The committee
appears to avoid consciously any characterization of itself as a legally-based
institution or of its various pronouncements as legal documents.
Yet, the committee, particularly with its "1988 Capital Report", has
spawned significant and widespread national legislation and regulatory instruments within the member countries of the committee. Further, the influence of
the committee appears to be truly global.
How all this has come about has been through a rather complex process. In
one respect, it appears that the committee has built up a considerable reservoir
of goodwill among its member supervisors, which has enabled it to reach a
consensus on such sticky issues as capital adequacy and consolidated supervision and which has produced an informal confirmation of national implementary actions by the members. 38 In another respect, the EC single market
efforts have provided a regional legal framework for the shaping and national
implementation of the Basle standards. The EC framework, however, goes
beyond its twelve Member States to a "wider Europe". To a lesser, but real
extent, the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) framework may
have a somewhat analogous impact in the Western Hemisphere. Added to this
are the indirect law reform requirements of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank and IFIs (international financial institutions) and the
individual reform agendas of emerging and transitional economies. Putting
together this complex of various international and internal dynamics, one
begins to understand the deep and wide convergence impact the Basle
Committee is having on the prudential standards and practices of national bank
supervisors respecting the limited, but important, areas of the Committee's
39
agenda.
Are the pronouncements of the Basle Committee a type of "international
administrative soft law"? Most probably, yes!
It is important in all this that it is understood that the development of these
international banking supervision standard is not an obscure and remote
subject matter for Swiss gnomes. It is an area that has had a profound impact
over the last decade upon the United States, United Kingdom, European
Community and other major industrialised countries respective regulatory
approaches to risk-based capital adequacy and capital-based supervisory
schemes, to money laundering, to the treatment of foreign banks, to regional
integration efforts (for example, EC and NAFTA) and the provisions on
financial services, to derivative activities and even more generally to the
competitiveness of banking industry in the major industrialized countries and
globally.
Yet what has all this to do with South Africa and Southern Africa? First, if
See "Remarks by E Gerald Corrigan, President" (n 30). Consider also significant impact the
Basle Committee is having on national regulatory practice respecting derivatives activities. See,
inter alia, "Fed's Philips gives update on int'l coordination on derivatives activities" 1994 BNA
Bank Rep No 2, 62.
19 See Diagram One appended to the end of this article.
3
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the banking industry is to serve as one of the viable "engines" for South Africa's
ambitious plans for reconstruction and development it must be grounded upon
a "safe and sound" floor of effective and efficient prudential supervision. In
this context, as noted earlier in this article, the South African lawmaker have
chosen (and correctly so) to embody the Basle standards within its banking law
and bank supervisory practices.
Second, if the South African banking industry is to have access to and
interconnections with the major international banking institutions and financial markets, it must demonstrate objectively that it is prepared to live by the
same "rules of the road" that govern these major institutions and markets (that
is, the Basle standards).
Third, it seems clear that the future, long-term prospects for economic
success for South Africa are inseparably linked to sustainable economic
development in Southern Africa. This will require the creation of a "safe and
sound", integrated banking framework throughout the region. The burden of
leadership and direction here falls squarely on the shoulders of South Africa's
banking industry and bank supervisors. And, here, once again, a broad
commitment to and fostering of the Basle standards will be essential.
Yet, while South Africa and Southern Africa need to be wedded to the Basle
standards and process, this "marriage" will create enormous strains and
difficulties. How does one "grow" and utilize the once minority South African
banking system in a "safe and sound way" to meet the enormous financial
demands of the country and of the region? How does one implement a
"risk-based capital adequacy system" compatible with Basle in a capital short
and risk sensitive region? What does "effective consolidated supervision"
mean for the country and the region? How does one effectively mesh the
countries supervisory framework with those of other countries in the region?
3 The internaldimension
Traditionally, governmental laws and regulations regarding the lending functions of banking institutions have been based on prudential concerns. However, the recent Botshabelo Accord as to South Africa and recent banking laws
and regulations in the United States appear to be placing more emphasis on
social objectives such as "fair lending". In effect, there appears to be a trend
toward the politicization and socialization of bank supervisory regulation and
practices. As this author's expertise is with United States banking laws and
practices, and not with those of the Republic of South Africa, he will analyze
in this part 3 the advent of "fair lending" in the United States, with the hope
of drawing some fruitful insights and guidance for the South African government banking authorities and banking industry.
3.1 The background to the United States experience
Fair lending laws are those laws imposed on banks and lending institutions,
which are aimed at achieving social objectives rather than at insuring the
"safety and soundness" of the banking system. Specifically, fair lending laws
are designed to insure that low-income and minority groups of our society,
which in the past may have been denied "fair" access to credit or financial
services, can obtain such credit on "fair" terms and thus improve their social
condition. Fair lending laws, in other words, can be seen as part of civil rights
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reform and as a socially motivated form of credit allocation within an
economy.40
The early examples of United States fair lending laws, as will be discussed
below, are the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Fair Housing
Act (FHA). Both these acts, which have been in existence for some time,
specifically prohibit lending discrimination, which occurs when a bank or
lending institution treats a credit applicant less favorably or decides not to
extend credit to such applicant on a prohibited basis such as race or gender. Fair
lending laws in the United States now also include the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), and the
recently enacted "Reigle" Community Development and Regulatory Act of
1994 ("1994 Reigle Act").
Concerned about allegations of widespread "redlining" and lending discrimination within the banking industry, the Clinton administration has tried to
improve and to enhance the existing fair lending laws. It has undertaken two
"fair lending" initiatives to achieve this goal. The first initiative consists of
issuance of an "Interagency Policy Statement" in March 1994, which attempts
to clarify, regroup and even redefine what constitutes lending discrimination
under the ECOA and the FHA, the two federal statutes that expressly prohibit
lending discrimination. The second initiative is aimed at increasing community
lending in underdeveloped areas and consists of a call for reform and increased
emphasis by regulators on enforcement of the CRA, and of the passage of the
41
1994 Reigle Act.
Recent applications of the United States fair lending laws suggest that failure
to comply with the community responsibility requirements of the CRA can be
considered lending discrimination in violation of the ECOA and the FHA. The
Chevy Chasecase, discussed below, is an example of this change in the standard
used to determine lending discrimination. In effect, the regulators, through
their administrative and rule-making processes are transporting affirmative
legal standards from a statute such as the CRA into a statute such as ECA which
does not create any affirmative obligation to lend but which (unlike the CRA)
has tougher sanctions. The government and regulators are "mix-and-matching" legal standards and sanctions from different statutes.
What is happening, to a large extent, is that lending discrimination and
community responsibility issues are joined "safety and soundness" concerns
among (for example, see, part 2 of this article) the priorities of United States
federal financial institution regulators. Traditionally, United States banking
statutes, regulations, policy statements, and guidelines have been premised on
the fundamental principle that the banking business must be conducted in a
"safe and sound" manner to preserve the solvency of the financial institution
and the federal deposit insurance funds.
Governmental policy regarding the regulation of the banking industry has
been focused on safety and soundness concerns, and not on social objectives
aimed at assisting individual bank customers, except for the deposit insurance
scheme which could be said to be user-oriented. 42 But, beginning, however, in
See generally Norton & Whitley Banking Law Manual (1995) ch 7 ("public interest aspects of
banking").
41 See, inter alia, "Special edition on fair lending policy" 14 Banking Policy Rep No 3 (6-20 Feb
1995).
42See Norton and Whitley (n 40) ch 2, § 2.04.
4
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the late 1960s and early 1970s, United States federal legislation addressing
protection of consumers, ensurance of community-wide access to banking, and
expansion of civil rights policies into the financial markets appeared. Although
consumer protection (for example the federal Truth-in-Lending Act) has
objective, "fair lending" has not
become a major congressional and regulatory
43
been given such emphasis until now.
The March 1994 Policy Statement (discussed below) signifies an important
change in United States governmental policy." It indicates that fair lending
laws are becoming a higher priority among federal regulators and a new
objective of the Clinton administration. This objective is to be realized through
legislative and regulatory enhancement of the fair lending laws and through
vigorous and aggressive governmental (and, perhaps in the future, even
private) enforcement efforts. The increased importance of this objective is also
evidenced by the legislative passage of the "Reigle" Community Development
and Regulatory 45Improvement Act of 1994, directed in large part to community
banking issues.
The fair lending initiatives by the Clinton administration purport to be
consistent with "safety and soundness" concerns. For example, the March 1994
"Policy Statement" explicitly asserts that fair lending is not inconsistent with
"safe and sound" operations and that lenders must continue to ensure that their
4
lending practices are consistent with safe and sound operating policies. 6
However, the banking industry has expressed substantive concern about the
compatibility of fair lending requirement with sound and safe operations. This
concern seems to be based on the lack of guidance by the regulators as to how
to comply with many of the fair lending requirements without sacrificing the
safety and soundness of the financial institution.
The banking industry also claims practices welcomed from a CRA standpoint or a fair lending perspective are often criticized by examiners from the
"safety and soundness" perspective while fair lending laws compliance examiners have criticized loan practices that are based on a safety and soundness
requirement dictated by law. Thus, in response to the added emphasis on fair
lending laws enforcement, as exemplified by the March Policy Statement, the
banking industry has demanded a stronger, more affirmative statement,
emphasizing the importance of safe and sound lending and addressing how to
balance the objectives of fair lending with safety and soundness standards to
accurately reflect the standards to which the banking industry is held. 47
3.2 The bases of the fair lending policy
The March 1994 Policy Statement, the "Reigle" Act, and the efforts to reform
the Community Reinvestment Act are the bases of the recent federal government's emphasis on fair lending.
41For more on consumer legislation, see Norton and Whitley (n 40) ch 10.
"Policy statement on discrimination in lending" 59 Fed Reg 18266 (15 April 1994).
45 1994 Reigle Act, 103 Pub L 324.
"Policy statement on discrimination in lending" 59 Fed Reg 18267 (April 1994).
47 The banking industry was given the opportunity to comment on the March 1994 "Policy
statement" and on 22 June 1994 it released a letter to the regulators with their comments on the
"Policy statement". The banking industry concerns regarding the fair lending laws compatibility
with safety and soundness principles were taken from this letter.
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3.2.1 The March policy statement
On March 8, 1994, the ten federal agencies responsible for enforcing fair
lending laws issued a Policy Statement on lending discrimination. The Policy
Statement was in part a response to calls by the banking industry for greater
regulatory clarity in view of the Clinton administration efforts to increase the
enforcement of fair lending laws. It purports to provide guidance about what
the agencies consider in determining if lending discrimination exists and to
provide a foundation for future interpretations and rule makings by these
agencies. Thus, although the Policy Statement does not carry the force of law,
the ten agencies will rely upon its definition of discrimination when enforcing
fair lending laws.
The Policy Statement applies to all lenders, including mortgage brokers,
issuers of credit cards, and any other person who extends credit of any type.
Although there are other federal statutes which seek to promote fair lending,
such as the CRA and the HMDA, the March Policy Statement is based upon
and addresses only the ECOA and the FHA, the two statutes that specifically
prohibit lending discrimination.
Under the Policy Statement, the following three principal methods are
4
outlined as proof of lending discrimination under the ECOA and the FHA: 8
(a)

Overt Discrimination. Overt discrimination is defined in the Policy
Statement as blatant discrimination on a prohibited basis. This means
discrimination based on race, age, sex, religion, or any other basis covered
by the ECOA or the FHA. Although overt discrimination as defined in the
policy statement sounds fairly obvious, it may not always be easy for banks
and other institutions to detect and safeguard against it. For example, the
Policy Statement warns against issuing credit cards with different borrowing limits based on a customer's age.
Moreover, overt discrimination can be subtle in nature and, therefore,
difficult to detect, even by institutions that do not condone discrimination
in any form. As a result, management of such institutions may be lulled
into a false sense of complacency and not be diligent enough in their efforts
to detect subtle forms of discrimination. For example, a branch receptionist who for personal reasons may dislike a certain race could be discouraging applicants over the phone or through body language when the
potential borrower inquires about a loan. The absence of a smile or
handshake or avoidance of eye contact are other subtle actions that could
discourage potential borrowers. Thus, lenders are advised by the Policy
Statement to take steps to discover the subtle forms of "overt" discrimination. This can be achieved through training, testing, and monitoring.
(b) DisparateTreatment. Disparate treatment means treating some applicants
differently from other applicants based on one of the prohibited factors.
Disparate treatment can be subtle or overt, making it difficult to identify
and interpret.
The loan application process is the most obvious area of concern
regarding disparate treatment. The Policy Statement warns against being
more helpful to some applicants than to others even if the practice is not
motivated by prejudice or a conscious intention to discriminate. Practices
4

See 59 Fed Reg 18268 (15 April 1994).

TSAR 1995.2

[ISSN 0257-7747]

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CROSSROADS FOR BANKING SUPERVISION

235

that might put a lender at risk during the loan application process could
include: taking additional time to inquire about items listed on the
application, asking a question about potential area of concern or taking
the time to discuss all available loan programs. The Policy Statement does
not try to impose a certain level of assistance, but it emphasizes that all
applicants must receive the same treatment.
To avoid problems with disparate treatment, banks should be comprehensive in their review of loan files. This will help examiners who
otherwise may have difficulties interpreting an individual's credit application experience. Despite the difficulty in assessing the pre-application
interview process, banks can overcome this to some extent by training,
testing, and careful monitoring aimed at identifying potential areas of risk.
Another pitfall for lenders in terms of disparate treatment relates to
explanations about why applicants may receive different treatment.
Although a lender may believe that a valid explanation has been given for
such treatment, an examiner might find reason to dig deeper, resulting in
a finding of discrimination. Consequently, institutions must ensure proper
training of personnel and consistency in approvals and disapprovals of
applicants.
In addition, banks must understand that they cannot confine their
self-analysis of fair lending practices to data gathered under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). HMDA data may raise red flags for
it does not
both examiners and institutions about lending practices, but
49 Therefore,
discrimination.
of
represent substantial or tangible evidence
banks must take the extra step of conducting statistical analysis of their
loan files to see if credit reports and debt ratios indicate practices of
lending discrimination. "Self-testing" becomes a new and important
aspect of bank internal procedures; though, it is unclear whether negative
information obtained in such testing can be used against the institution by
the regulators (a practical form of "self-incrimination").
(c) Disparateimpact. For lenders and regulators, disparate impact is the most
difficult kind of discrimination to address. Disparate impact occurs when
a lending practice applies uniformly to all applicants, but the practice has
a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified as a
"business necessity". In other words, a policy or practice that may have a
disproportionate adverse impact on a group which is protected under
ECOA or FHA is subject to an "effects test". For example, a bank may
have a uniform credit policy not to originate mortgages for less than
$60 000. Even though this is a uniform policy regardless of race, sex, or
national origin, the credit policy might be found to have a disparate impact
because it has a disproportionate adverse impact on applicants from a
protected class. Although a bank is given an opportunity to justify the
credit policy based on business necessity, the Policy Statement does not
clearly define or give examples of what the agencies consider to be a
justifiable business necessity. Therefore, the implementation of a disparate impact analysis is potentially problematic.
HMDA requires the compilation, aggregation and disclosure of the number and dollar
amount of home mortgage and home improvement loans originated or purchased by a banking
institution. These requirements are aimed at preventing "redlining". For a more detailed
explanation of the HMDA and its requirements, see Norton and Whitley (n 40) ch 9.

49The
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Bankers are concerned that the implementation of the disparate impact
analysis will prohibit banks from employing legitimate credit policies. For
example, using the example above, banks could argue that originating
mortgages loans for less than $60 000 is not profitable enough to warrant
its practice. But to the dismay of banks and other financial institutions, the
Policy Statement does not provide guidance in this respect. Without the
Policy Statement providing specific guidance regarding what constitutes
acceptable business necessity, bankers will continue to be uncertain about
government policy in the fair-lending area.
Although the Policy Statement purports to clarify fair lending requirements by defining the methods of proof of lending discrimination, the
federal banking regulators still need to provide further clarification
regarding the standards for compliance with the fair lending laws.
It appears that the department of housing and urban development
intends to issue a regulation, by or during Spring 1995, that will be
designed to provide regulatory clarification and legitimacy to the "disparate impact" theory.5 0
From a "real-politick" perspective, it appears that the "payback" for
the governmental S & L and bank bailouts and a precondition to further
deregulation would be (at least from the eyes of the Clinton administration
and bank bureaucracy) the banking industry "buy-in" respecting the
government's fair-lending agenda.
3.2.2 The 1994 Reigle Act
On September 29, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the "Reigle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994" (1994
Reigle Act). The fair lending provisions of the act are in Title I, called the
Community Development and Consumer Protection Act, which is designed to
enhance lending to underdeveloped areas (subtitle A) and to clamp down on
"reverse redlining" (that is, exploitive extensions of home equity credit in
minority and low income areas) (Subtitle B). Subtitle A of the 1994 Reigle Act
and the CRA in a way compliment each other in their attempt to expand
lending in underdeveloped communities. While the CRA attempts to enhance
lending in underdeveloped areas by imposing an affirmative responsibility, and
continuing obligation, on banks and thrifts to help meet the credit needs of the
communities in which they operate, the 1994 Reigle Act creates a special fund
designed to assist certain qualified new and existing community lenders to
provide capital and other resources to economically-depressed communities.
Not surprisingly, the 1994 Reigle Act also directs federal banking agencies to
review the CRA examination and enforcement system as early as possible to
implement the Administration's fair lending initiatives.51
3.2.3 CRA Reform Proposal
From its inception, the CRA has been criticized by the banking industry as
ambiguous and lacking clear standards of compliance. Thus, as part of the
Clinton administration "fair lending" initiatives, in July, 1993, the federal
50 See 59 Fed Reg 57,632 and 57,087 (14 Nov 1994).
511994 Reigle Act, 103 PL 324.
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banking regulators began a comprehensive review and overhaul of the interagency regulation of the CRA. The regulators' mission is to reform the CRA
regulations to provide clearer guidance on what banks and thrifts should expect
from CRA examinations, emphasize performance over documentation, and
refocus the regulation on making credit and financial services available to all
communities, including undeserved areas throughout urban and rural
America.
As a result of this review of the CRA regulations, the regulators have so far
issued two sets of proposed changes to the CRA regulations. These changes,
the regulators claim, will greatly expand credit to minority-owned business.
The first proposal was issued in December, 1993 and was strongly opposed by
the banking industry. 52 The second proposal drops several requirements from
the December plan, but adds a new requirement that still faces opposition from
the banking industry, particularly larger banks. 53 This new requirement would
require banks to report race and gender information on small-business loan
applications. The race and sex information could be used to prove discrimination against minority-owned business much the same way the HMDA data
has been used to prove discrimination against minority home-buyers. The
regulators received substantial comments on the last proposal and had promised to issue new CRA regulations by the end of 1994. However, with the
dramatic congressional political shift to the right in the November 1994
elections, it appears the Clinton administration and regulators are moving
more cautiously in issuing the pending regulations. In view of the opposition
the CRA reform still faces, it remains to be seen what their final outcome will
be.
3.3 Component parts of fair lending
The ECOA, the FHA, the CRA, and the HMDA are the main components of
the fair lending laws. Although they impose different requirements, as a whole
they are tools the federal government will use to achieve the objectives of fair
lending.
3.3.1 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
The ECOA became effective on October 28, 1974 and has been termed the first
civil rights statute to deal with consumer credit. 54 The premise of the statute is
that all consumers and businesses should have an equal opportunity to obtain
credit. While not expressly directed to the allocation of credit, the ECOA does
55
not prohibit a lender from allocating or extending on a discriminatory basis.
However, recent applications of the ECOA suggest that the standard for
compliance might be changing and that a bank could be liable under the ECOA
for allocating credit on a discriminatory basis.
As originally enacted, the ECOA prohibited credit discrimination by
financial institutions and other institutions on the basis of sex or marital status.
52 See "Proposed Community Reinvestment Act Regulations" 58 Fed Reg 67466, 67474 (1993).

53 See "Proposed Community Reinvestment Act Regulations" 59 Fed Reg 51323 (7 Oct 1994).
5 Pub L No 90-321, Title VII § 701 etseqq, as added to by Pub L No 93-495; 88 Stat 1521, and
amended by Pub L No 94-239, § 2 et seqq; 90 Stat 251; 15 USC § 1691 et seqq.
55 See generally Bender VIII Banking Law ch 154; Maltz and Miller "Equal Credit Opportunity
Act and Regulation B" 1978 Okla L Rev 1.
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As amended, the statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and marital
status, race, religion, national origin, age (provided the applicant has the
capacity to contract), and receipt of public assistance benefits. The ECOA
prohibits discrimination against a person who in good faith exercises a right
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA").56 The Federal Reserve
Board of Governors (FRB) has the statutory responsibility to implement the
ECOA and has done so through its Regulation B. 57
Regulation B provides the following general rule: "A creditor shall not
discriminateagainst an applicanton a prohibitedbasis regarding any aspect of
a credit transaction".58
Regulation B contemplates two mechanisms of applicant credit evaluation:
those that have an objective basis and those that have a subjective basis. 59
Under Regulation B, the following subjective criteria may be considered by a
creditor under specified conditions: 6o
(1) Age may be considered only for purposes of determining a certain
element of credit-worthiness, such as in situations favoring an elderly
applicant or in assessing the significance of the applicant's length
of employment or residence (if this is done to favor the applicant). An
applicant's life expectancy may be considered as a variable determinant;
(2) Income from a public assistance program may be considered in the
context of the length of time an applicant has been receiving such income,
residence requirements for the program, and continuing stability of the
income; and
(3) Child bearing or child rearing information as it may pertain to a
diminution of income may be considered in the same way and for the
same reasons as diminished income for any other reason.
The ECOA and Regulation B also set forth restrictions with respect to
information concerning income sources, and credit history.
Various federal agencies are responsible for specific enforcement of the
ECOA and Regulation B.61 Unlike other consumer statutes, the ECOA does
not provide for criminal penalties. However, civil penalties, including actual
damages and punitive damages, may be collected. Injunctive and declaratory
relief may also be granted under the ECOA, and court costs and reasonable
attorneys fees may be awarded, if a complainant is successful in his claim. 62
The enforcement mechanisms for the Equal Credit Opportunity Act are
strengthened by the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). The federal banking agencies are required to refer loan
discrimination violations of the ECOA to the justice department. This section
also authorizes the justice department to seek actual and punitive damages for
56 15 USC § 1691(a).
57 12 CFR § 202. See generally FRB "Background and summary of regulation B". On9April 1992,
the FRB published revisions to its official staff commentary interpreting its Regulation B on the
ECOA. See 57 Fed Reg 12,202 (9 Apr 1992).
5 12 CFR § 202.4--emphasis added.
59 12 CFR §§ 202.2(p) and 202.6(b).
See generally 12 CFR § 202.6. The FRB has issued "Interpretations of regulation B" involving
consideration of income and disclosure of reasons for adverse action, which are to be effective

in April 1983. See 39 Wash Fin Rep No 15 (18 Oct 1982) 701.

61See 15 USC § 1691 et seqq, Appendix A.
62 12 CFR § 202.1(c).
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violations. The secretary of housing and urban development must be notified
referred to the justice department that may also be
of alleged violations not
63
violations of the FHA.
In a footnote to Regulation B, the FRB incorporated a concept utilized in the
64
employment area, known as the "effects test".
it:65
that
regard,
in
this
The FRB has stated,
"interprets the application of an 'effects test' to the credit area to mean that the use of certain
information in determining credit-worthiness, even though such information is not specifically
proscribed by proposed 202.6(b) may violate the amended Act if the use of that information has
the effect of denying credit to a class of persons not of that class, unless the creditor is able to
establish that the information has a manifest relationship to credit-worthiness. Even then, if an
aggrieved applicant could show that a creditor could have used a less discriminatory method
which would serve the creditor's need to evaluate credit-worthiness as well as the challenged
method, a violation may be found to exist."

This rather limited test is currently being expanded by the regulators by analogy
in creating its general "disparate impact test" vis-A-vis "fair lending".
3.3.2 The Fair Housing Act (FHA)
The Fair Housing Act was originally enacted in 1968, and substantially
amended in 1988. The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
colour, national origin, religion, sex, handicap, or familial status in any real
estate-related transaction, including home mortgage loans, loans for mobile
66
homes, home improvement loans, and property appraisals. The March 1994
Policy Statement specifically addresses the FHA and attempts to clarify what
type of conduct is considered a violation of the Act by defining three methods
67
of proof of lending discrimination courts have recognized under the FHA.
The FHA provides for enforcement by three means: (1) private lawsuits in
federal court by persons who believe that they have been injured by an act of
unlawful discrimination; (2) complaints to HUD, which investigates and
attempts to conciliate, and, where unsuccessful, issues a charge of discrimination when it has reasonable cause to believe the FHA has been violated.
The matter is then resolved in a proceeding before an administrative law judge
or in federal court; and (3) lawsuits in federal court by the department of
justice. 68
Where the department of justice files a lawsuit alleging the existence of a
pattern or practice of discrimination, the court may award injunctive relief,
monetary damages (both compensatory and punitive) to individual victims of
proven discrimination, and, to vindicate the public interest, a civil penalty
payable to the United States of up to $50 000 per defendant for the first
69
violation and $100 000 for subsequent violations.
6 See FDICIA § 223.
12 CFR § 202.6, n 7, citing Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 United States 424 (1971); Albermarle
PaperCo v Moody 422 United States 405 (1975).
41 FedReg 874 (20 July 1976). See generally Baer" 'The Equal Credit Opportunity Act' and the
'Effects Test' " 1978 Banking LJ 291.
6 42 USC s 3601-3619, 3631.
67 "Policy statement on discrimination in lending" 59 Fed Reg 18267 (15 April 1994).
See Norton and Whitley (n 40) ch 9, sec 9.10[21.
6 For a more detailed description of the FHA, see Norton and Whitley (n 40) ch 9.70 Pub L No
95-128, Title VIII; 91 Stat 1147; 12 USC § 2901 et seqq. See generally Bender (n 55) ch 158.
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3.3.3 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
The legislative history of the CRA70 demonstrates that congress considered the
CRA to be an integral part of the overall scheme of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977. 71 Specifically, this legislation was
directed against the practice of "redlining", that is, the use of funds deposited
by residents in neighbourhood institutions for purposes that would not benefit
the depositors or the neighbourhoods. 72 In recent years, compliance with the
CRA standards have been aggressively pursued by the federal regulators in
their various application processes. An example of the importance of CRA
standards in the regulatory application process is evidenced by the dominance
of the CRA issue in the FRB's approval, in November 1991, of the merger
between Chemical Corp. and Manufacturers Hanover Corp. In the FRB's 35
pages order, the pages were devoted to a discussion of current and future
participation in CRA-related problems.
The primary purpose of the CRA is to encourage financial institutions to
meet the credit needs of the local communities they serve, consistent with the
safe and sound operation of the institution. This purpose is achieved through
examination of these institutions by the appropriate federal financial supervisory agency. 73
The CRA applies to all "regulated financial institutions" (that is, an
institution whose deposits are insured by the government insurance fund). 7a
The CRA does not establish specific requirements for bank performance, but
seeks to use the bank's examination process as a device for fostering acceptable
"standards" of performance. The standard for assessing the performance of
each financial institution is subjective, and is whether each institution serves
the convenience and needs of the community in which it is chartered to do
75
business.
The CRA does not establish a new framework for bank regulation or
examination, but is superimposed upon, and accordingly is limited by, the
existing federal regulatory structures. Thus, the regulatory authorities that
implement the CRA are as follows: (1) the Comptroller supervises national
banks; (2) the FRB supervises state-chartered banks that are members of the
FRS, and supervises bank holding companies; (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) supervises state-chartered banks and savings banks
that are not members of the FRS, the deposits of which are insured by the
FDIC; and (4) the Office of Trust Supervision (OTS) supervises institutions
with deposits governmentally insured, and supervises Savings Association
76
holding companies.
77
The purpose of the CRA examination is two-fold:
70 See, eg, 123 Cong Rec 1202 (daily ed 24 Jan 1979).
71 See generally Hearings on s 406 Before the senate comm on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1977).
7 See, inter alia, "The legality of redlining under the civil rights laws" 1977 Am Univ L Rev 463
(1977); "Redlining practices, racial resegregation, and urban decay: neighborhood housing
services as a viable alternative" 1975 Urb Law 510.
73 12 USC § 2901 b.
74 12 USC §
2
75 12 USC § 2901 a and (b) and § 2903.
7612 USC § 2902(1).
77See generally Givens "Antiredlining issue: can banks be forced to lend?" 1978 Banking IJ 515;
Healy "A banker's guide to the Community Reinvestment Act" 1979 Banking LJ 705; "The
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(1) The continuing assessment and monitoring of a banking institution's
record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low
and moderate income neighbourhoods, consistent with the "safe and
sound" operations of such institution; and
(2) The consideration of such record of performance when evaluating an
"application" by such institution.
The term "application for a deposit facility" by a national bank, would
include, for example, an application for a charter for a national bank, deposit
insurance in connection with a newly chartered institution, the establishment of
the relocation of a home or branch office, and mergers or
a domestic branch,
78
acquisitions.
The CRA provides that the appropriate federal financial supervisory agency
79
has a duty to carry out the purposes of the CRA.8 0 The respective federal
other.
each
to
regulations are substantively parallel
These regulations are illustrated by the requirement of the Comptroller that
a national bank:
(1) Prepare and annually review a delineation of the local community or
communities that comprise the entire lending territory of a bank (as
portrayed on a map or maps), without excluding low and moderate
income neighbourhoods. A national bank is permitted to use its "effective lending territory," defined as that area or areas around each office or
group of offices where it makes "a substantial portion of its loans," and
all areas equally distant from its offices as those areas. The reasonableness of this delineation will be reviewed by the national bank examiners;81
(2) Adopt a Community Reinvestment Act statement ("CRA Statement")
82
for each delineated community; and
of its offices (other than off-premise
each
(3) Post in the public lobby at
notice ("CRA Notice") in the form
public
a
facilities)
deposit
electronic
prescribed by the CRA.83
These are the only express requirements of specific action to be taken by a
national bank or a federal S&L.
The various CRA regulations do not provide specific guidelines for assessing
community reinvestment act regulation: another attempt to control redlining" 1979 Cath Univ
L Rev 635.
12 USC § 2901(3).
12 USC § 2905.
80Cf FRB "Regulation BB" 12 CFR § 228; Comptroller's "CRA Regulations" 12 CFR § 25; FDIC
"CRA Regulations" 12 CFR § 345; and FHLBB CRA Regulations 12 CFR § 563(e). As required
by FIRREA, the FFIEC has issued final guidelines for depository institution CRA rating
classifications ("outstanding", "satisfactory", "needs improvement", or "substantial noncompliance") and for related public CRA disclosure. The final rule needs to be implemented by the
respective federal regulator. See 55 Fed Reg 18,163 (1 May 1990). The OTS has approved the
FFIEC's CRA changes (Thrift Bulleting 47). The "whistle-blower" protection provisions of
FIRREA retroactively protects a depository institution official from employment discharge for
reporting CRA violations. See Hicks v RTC 767 F Supp 167 (NDIUI 1991). The FFIEC has
prepared an overview pamphlet on the CRA for public bank distribution, which has been
adopted for distribution by the regulators.
81 12 CFR § 25.3.
8212 CFR § 25.4.
8 12 CFR § 25.6.
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the performance of banking institutions. Performance is assessed within the
context of (1) serving the "convenience and needs" of the communities being
served (which is to include the needs for credit services as well as deposit
services), consistent with (2) the "safe and sound" operations of the banking
institution . 4
The phrase "community convenience and needs" first appeared in the Bank
Act of 1935, with respect to certification by the Comptroller that a national
bank is eligible for FDIC insurance.85 One author points out that the Senate
Report on this act merely makes reference that the aforementioned factors
"are similar to those which are considered by the Comptroller of the Currency
in authorizing national banks to commence business". 6 At that time, the
Comptroller required an examiner investigating a bank that had applied for a
charter to consider traditional matters related to economic safety and soundness. 8 7 Relying on the regulatory procedures of the Comptroller at that time,
congress was therefore primarily addressing the requirement that the community be able to support the banking facilities to be chartered.
The phrase "convenience and needs of the community" appears in two other
bank related statutes, the Bank Merger Act88 and the Bank Holding Company
Act.8 9 Under these acts, the phrase addresses traditional considerations of
competition and sufficient business to ensure the success of the bank, as
distinguished from any obligation of a bank to meet the community credit
needs.
As required by FIRREA, the Offices of Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), FRB, FDIC and OTS have each adopted final CRA disclosure rules
respecting the supervisor's assessment of an institution's CRA performance.
The FFIEC had adopted a final rule on the manner of agency disclosure, and
has adopted other CRA-related policy statements and guidelines.90
In a memorandum, dated December 15, 1994, the department of justice's
Office of Legal Counsel advised the Comptroller of the Currency that the
federal banking agencies lacked the authority to put into place CRA regulation
that contained enforcement action methods contained in 12 United States C.
§1818. The CRA does not impose an obligation that could give rise to a § 1818

84 See, eg, 12 CFR § 25.7.
2 USC§ 1816.
86See generally Dennis "The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: Defining 'Convenience and
Needs' of the Community" 1980 Banking LU 45.
See "Instructions of the comptroller of the currency relative to the organization and powers of
national banks" (1920).
8 12 USC § 1828(c)(5)(B).
8 12 USC § 1842(c)(2.
90 Eg, on 6 December 1991, FFIEC adopted a policy statement for the purpose of assisting financial
institutions to analyze geographic distinction of their loans for purposes of CRA compliance. In
addition, on 17 June 1992, the FFIEC issued guidance for the federal bank and thrift regulatory
agency examiners examining institutions for CRA compliance. The Federal Housing Financing
Board also adopted a final rule on 15 October 1991, requiring all members of the Federal Home
Loan Bank system to submit a "community support statement" on the community lending
efforts to qualify for long-term advances from federal home loan banks, which statement is to
be filed every two years and must include the institutions latest CRA examination report,
information on the members assistance to first home buyers, reports on Equal Credit
Opportunity Act/Fair Credit Act compliance, and any additional information indicating
community support.
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action: the agencies control over the application evaluation procedures (in91
cluding denial) is currently the exclusive CRA enforcement mechanism.
Under the 1991 FDICIA, public disclosure of the records of financial
institutions lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers in their communities is broadened to include the "facts and date" supporting conclusions of the
federal banking agencies conducting CRA examinations. Under prior law, the
could include only a discussion of "facts"
public reports of such regulators
92
supporting such conclusions.
3.3.4 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).93
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, as amended (HMDA), requires
depository institutions to collect and disseminate data about mortgage loans,
and applications for such loans. There is an exemption for small institutions
with total assets below $30 million. Mortgage information must be grouped by
census tract, income level, race, and gender. Federal Reserve Regulation C,
which applies to banks, thrifts, and holding company subsidiaries, requires that
loans be categorized according to: (1) Originations and purchases; (2) Number
of loans and dollar amount; and (3) type of loan (conventional home loan,
government program loan, home improvement, multi-dwelling, or nonoccupant borrower).
The Federal Financial Institution Examinations Council ("FFIEC") prepares disclosure statements for institutions, that must be made available to the
public upon request. The FFIEC also compiles aggregate data for metropolitan
areas. HMDA data is used to monitor and evaluate compliance with the CRA
and housing laws. As the type and form of data required increases, so do the
reporting burdens and costs to the affected institutions. In addition, such data
can be used as a "whip- saws" against such institutions by the regulatory the
Justice Department, and increasing by sophisticated interest groups.
3.4 Selective examples of applications
Although the ECOA and FHA do not explicitly require lenders to undertake
affirmative actions to encourage or facilitate lending to protected class
members, recent applications of these fair lending laws suggest that in order to
assure compliance with the ECOA and FHA lenders must do more than avoid
lending discrimination, but must also engage in some type of affirmative action
to make credit available to protected class members. The fair lending enforcement actions taken to date by the department of justice centre around issues of
(i) pricing discrimination, (ii) product and services discrimination, and
(iii) market-based definition discrimination.
3.4.1 The Chevy chase case: 94 What is the appropriate standard?
The justice department recently settled a case against Chevy Chase Federal
Savings Bank for alleged lending discrimination and redlining practices in
91 See "Congress limited agency enforcement of CRA, justice department memo" 64 BNA Bank
Rep 41 (2 Jan 1995).

91See FDICIA § 221.

93 For a more detailed description of the HMDA, see Norton and Whitley (n 40) ch 9, sec 9.09.
94 US v Chevy ChaseFederalSavings Bank, DC DC(docket number unavailable), 22 August 1994.
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violation of the ECOA and the FHA. The settlement agreement requires
Chevy Chase to pay $11 million to the redlined areas through a special loan
program and the opening of bank branches and mortgage offices.
Chevy Chase, the largest savings and loan association in the DC metropolitan area and one of the nation's largest thrifts, operates 78 branches and 20
mortgages offices. Prior to the justice department's investigation, the bank had
virtually all of its branches and mortgage offices in majority white areasdelineated by census tracts. The bank opened no branches in any of DC's
majority black census tracts, which accounts for 90% of all African Americans
in the city, nor had it opened branches in any of Prince George's County
majority black census tracks, accounting for 75% of that county's black
95
population.
The justice department claimed that the bank intentionally avoided soliciting
applications and making home mortgage loans in sections of the DC area that
are predominantly African American. It also attacked other marketing practices that allegedly contributed to the lack of lending activity in the African
American neighbourhoods. All these activities, the justice department alleged,
were in violation of the ECOA and the FHA. Although the Chevy Chase
consent decree alleges violations of the ECOA and the FHA, the claims it
asserts do not seem to be directly traceable to any specific provisions of those
laws when viewed in the light of prior interpretations and precedents. 96
As explained above, the ECOA and the FHA have been aimed at two types
of conduct: (1) discriminating on a prohibited basis against individuals who
have applied for a loan or have been granted a loan and (2) discouraging
individuals on a prohibited basis from submitting an application for credit.
However, the justice department made no allegation that either of these
practices had occurred in the case of Chevy Chase. Instead, it took the position
that Chevy Chase violated the FHA and the ECOA not by its actions in
connection with its treatment of borrowers, applicants, or prospective applicants, but rather by what it did not do with respect to persons with whom it did
not have any contact. Specifically by failing to adequately market its loan
products and avoiding doing business in minority census tracts located within
the bank's metropolitan area.
The Chevy Chasecase should have been brought under the provisions of the
CRA, which was enacted to curtail redlining practices such as the practices
Chevy Chase allegedly engaged into. But it seems that the government, in its
effort to expand the enforcement of the fair lending laws, decided to use the
ECOA and the FHA because they allow for more severe penalties than the
CRA and because congress assigned the justice department no role in
implementing or enforcing the CRA.
Thus, the significance of this case, asides from being an example of the stiff
penalties which can result from violations of the fair lending laws, is that it puts
the banking industry on notice regarding the type of proof the government
believes is required to put forth to substantiate a violation of the ECOA and the
FHA. This case indicates a change in the legal standard used to determine
violations of the ECOA and the FHA. The new standard appears to include
practices in violation of the CRA within the scope of the ECOA and the FHA.
95 Department of Justice Release, 21 January 1994.

9 id.
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Unfortunately, this case was settled and the courts were not given the
opportunity to clarify the standard under which violations of the fair lending
laws is to be judged. Nevertheless, the United States banking industry seems
not to want to wait for such clarification before adjusting its practices to
conform with the new standard suggested by the Chevy Chase case as banking
institution generally do not want to be in the position of defending itself against
these type of violations.
3.4.2 First National Bank of Vicksburg and Blackpipe State Bank cases
These two recent cases, both resulting in settlement agreements, also represent
good examples of the manner in which the fair lending laws are being applied
by the justice department.
In First National Bank of Vicksburg, this Mississippi bank came under
scrutiny by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) when data
from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act revealed discrepancies in the bank's
lending practices. In reviewing Vicksburg's records for 1992, the OCC discovered that the bank was charging blacks higher interest rates than whites on
unsecured home improvement loans. The bank charged nearly all of its black
borrowers interest rates from 14% to 21 %, while charging most of its white
borrowers rates of only about 10%. The OCC then referred the matter to the
justice department which determined that Vicksburg had engaged in a pattern
or practice of racial discrimination in violation of the FHA and the ECOA. In
order to settle the case, Vicksburg agreed to pay $50 000 in civil penalties and
create a $750 000 fund to compensate blacks who were overcharged on interest
rates. In addition, Vicksburg was required to undertake changes in its lending
practices including: (1) training its loan officers in principles of fair lending;
(2) using an application checklist to ensure the bank solicits and records all
relevant information; (3) conducting random testing to ensure employees are
not treating minorities differently from non-minorities, and (4) establishing a
goal of funding at least $1 million in loans to low and moderate income
borrowers .97
In another case, the justice department sued Blackpipe State Bank for
allegedly refusing to make secured loans where the collateral was located in a
reservation, for placing credit requirements on Native Americans that it did not
require from whites, and for charging Native Americans greater interest rates
and finance charges than those it charged to whites. Blackpipe State Bank
settled the case by agreeing to create a $125 000 compensatory fund for
discriminating against Native Americans and98to undertake specific actions to
enhance lending to the affected reservation.
Although these two cases involve clear lending discrimination in violation of
the ECOA and the FHA, they are a signal to the banking industry by the justice
department that fair lending requirements cannot be overlooked. The federal
government has sent a clear message that it regards lending discrimination as
a serious problem and that enforcement of fair lending law is a top priority.
But, as indicated recently by Fed Chairman Greenspan, risk-based pricing
disparities are permissible (though lenders need to be careful they do not run
afoul of fair lending requirements). 99
9 id.

9 id.

99See "Risk-Based Credit Pricing Compatible..
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3.5 Some implications
The reality of governmental intervention in the banking area in pursuit of social
objectives is certainly not new in the United States experience. As previously
indicated, the creation of a comprehensive deposit insurance scheme has clear
social as well as economic objectives; the anti-discriminatory statutes of ECOA
and CRA have existed for approximately two decades; and a host of consumerorientated, disclosure-based legislation such as Truth-in-Lending Act, Truthin-Savings Act, and various real estate lending Acts also have been in existence
for some time. What is significant about the most recent Clinton administration
and banking agencies' thrust into "fair lending" is an attempt to create an
interrelated (if not integrated) federal programme directed to actual credit
allocation goals. Certainly to the extent credit markets can be opened to lower
and middle class neighbourhoods and to small and medium-sized businesses,
the better the likelihood of economic development in those geographic areas
and in that business segment.
However, this "fair lending" programme in the United States is clearly
governmentally intrusive and directly interferes with normal market forces. In
addition, it brings into question the compatibility of the goals of fair lending
with the prudential requirements of "safety and soundness". Moreover, the
fair lending programme, despite its motivation, demonstrates the liberality
with which United States banking authorities view their role: here the
regulators, in their administrative discretion, control the faucet of enforcement
aggressiveness and are prone to legal imagination in transporting specific legal
standards or obligations from one statute into another statute devoid of such
standards but with tougher sanctions (governmental "mix-and-matching").
Also, the United States governmental "fair lending" program appears to be
another example of regulatory micromanagement and a counter-deregulatory
approach by the United States bank regulators.
Perhaps, as recently suggested by Fed Board governor, Lindsey, changing
other United States laws (for example the Davis-Bacon Act requiring union
wage scale for construction workers on certain banking facilities, the GlassSteagall Act precluding banks from any wide scale access to capital markets,
and real estate appraisal and minimum down-payment regulations) could have
a more beneficial effect of promoting home ownership and inner-city development than in continual questionable tinkering with CRA and other so-called
"fair lending" requirements. 100
From an "on-the-ground" context, the new governmental emphasis on fair
lending creates numerous practical dilemmas for United States banking institutions, including the following crises: 10 1
-

internal institutional loan policy formulations,
internal education programs at all and strategies levels,
approaches to possibly conflicting governmental examinations for differing
purposes,
impact on current reliance on "scorecard" credit evaluations,

1ooSee "Changing other laws could do the job CRA was intended for, fed's lindsey says" 63 BNA
Bank Rep 663 (7 Nov 1994).
10, For some

helpful practical suggestions on coping with "fair lending" see Stansifer "Fair lending

issues and concerns" 1995 J Commercial Lend 27.
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self-testing and internal monitoring procedures, and
review of credit denial processes.
Are there comparative lessons to be learned from the United States flirtation
with a governmental "fair lending programme"? First, there is a public
recognition that the banking industry as a primary financial intermediary in a
society can and should have a vital role to play in helping create greater access
to a society's financial resources and financial markets for previously excluded
societal groups. However, this role should not be forged at the expense of
distorting or significantly delimiting free market and competitive economic
forces.
Second, with respect to these financial institutions and markets, a government's primary concerns should be "safety and soundness" and "economic
competitiveness". In this respect whatever role these institutions and markets
are to play in creating greater access for the previously disenfranchised needs
to be constructed and effected in a manner consistent with prudential considerations and modern economic realities. On the one hand, private institutions
and markets should not be transformed into public institutions and should not
be over-laden with "governmental social responsibilities". On the other hand,
these institutions and markets must remain primarily driven by market forces,
as in the long-term this will be in the society's long-term-best interest. Also,
these institutions and markets should not be led into practices that will
jeopardize a "safe and sound prudential floor" or that will "up the ante" in
prudential terms (for example, creation of greater obstacles to compliance with
a Basle-based risk capital system).
Third, it should not be forgotten that an overly intrusive government into the
private economic sector most likely will lead to counterproductive results
(internally and internationally) and to greater costs and burdens for the private
sector. What South Africa and Southern Africa need are vibrant, marketresponsive and internationally credible financial institutions and markets.
-

4 Concluding observations
The future for the South African and Southern Africa economies will rest, to
a significant degree, upon viable, competitive and economically growing
private financial institutions and markets. This will require a large measure of
economic discipline and of governmental "level-headedness" in not unduly
intervening into or unduly burdening the ongoing development of these
institutions and markets. Clearly, moving toward a convergence with the
international Basle standards as to banking appears essential.
Yet, at the same time, the local and foreign investing financial institutions
should recognize a manageable, but contributing role in providing a broader
societal-based access to these institutions and financial markets. The Botshabelo Accord represents an "informal partnership" among government, the
banking industry, and diverse affected interest groups. Such an approach,
along with a heightened sense of self-enlightenment, self-direction, and
ongoing self-assessment by the banking industry in Southern Africa, appears to
be the type of excessive "proactive" strategy that will bring better long-term
societal results than an approach of excessive governmental intervention into,
and participation of, private economic activities and markets in pursuit of these
societal goals.
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SAMEVATTING
SENTRALE TOESIG OOR SUID-AFRIKAANSE BANKWESE OP DIE KRUISPAD
Die outeur bespreek aan die hand van die mees resente wysigings aan die Amerikaanse wetgewing
oor banktoesig die slaggate wat vir die Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomie en dus ook die heropbou en
ontwikkelingsprogram van die regering geled sou wees in 'n onoordeelkundige verabsolutering van
sentrale toesig oor die vryemark meganismes ten aansien van die leningsbankpraktyk indien dit
gepaard sou gaan met 'n inmenging in en totale negering van die tersake markkragte.
Die weg van 'n industrie gedrewe "vrywillige" samewerking van die kant van die bankwese om
bydraes tot die ontwikkeling van minder welaf dele van die gemeenskap te maak, borg volgens die
outeur 'n veel groter kans op sukses binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks as die klakkelose na-aap
van die Amerikaanse wetgewing gemik op dwangmatige uitwissing van sogenaamde diskriminerende leningspraktyke.
Die outeur toon dat selfs binne die Amerikaanse model steeds ruimte behoort te bestaan vir
erkenning van diskriminerende resultate mits dit op gesonde ekonomiese beginsels gebaseer sou
wees, soos die verhoogde kredietverskaffingsrisiko indien die kredietopnemer 'n ekonomies
beduidend slegter kredietrisiko sou wees.
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